Legal maxims and Islamic financial transactions: A case study of mortgage contracts and the dilemma for Muslims in Britain by Zakariyah, Luqman
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/15730255-12341240
Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 255-285 brill.nl/alq
Arab Law
Quarterly
Legal Maxims and Islamic Financial Transactions:
A Case Study of Mortgage Contracts 
and the Dilemma for Muslims in Britain
Luqman Zakariyah*
Al-Maktoum College of Higher Education, Dundee, UK
Abstract
This article aims to focus on legal maxims related to financial transactions to explore 
whether they offer any solutions for Muslims concerned with this dilemma, and to investi-
gate how such legal maxims can be used to shape the way in which Muslims in the West 
perceive today’s mortgage issues. Some questions raised are the following. When entering a 
mortgage contract, does a Muslim’s intention change the ruling of the transaction under 
the pretext of the two maxims al-ʿumūr bi maqāsịdihā (“matters considered according to 
intention”) and hal al-ʿibrah fī l-ʿuqūd bi l-maqāsịd wa l-maʿanī aw bi l-alfāz ̣wa l-mabānī 
(“in contracts, is effect given to intention and the meaning or expression and form”)? Can 
one be certain that mortgages are completely ḥarām (unlawful) when considering the 
maxim al-yaqīn lā yazūl bi l-shakk (“certainty cannot be repelled by doubt”)? What aspects 
of ḥarām are found in mortgages and can they be marginalized by the maxim al-ḍarūrāt 
tubīh al-maḥzụ̄rāt (“necessity makes the unlawful thing lawful”)? If Islam allows bayʿ 
al-istisṇāʿ (contract for manufacture) on the basis of ʿurf (custom), can mortgages also be 
permitted under the maxim al-ʿādah muḥakkamah (“custom is authoritative”)?
Keywords
legal maxim; mortgages; Muslims in the UK, intentionality; certainty; doubt; necessity; custom
1. Introduction
The circumstances in which Muslims find themselves in today’s world in 
general and in the Western world in particular compel contemporary 
* This article is a revised version of the author’s presentation at the International Confe-
rence on Banking and Finance: Cross-Border Practices and Litigation, organised by the 
Department of Islamic Law, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyah of Law and Harun M. Hashim Law 
Centre IIUM and the University of Wisconsin, USA, on 15-16 June 2010. l.zakariyah@
almi.abdn.ac.uk.
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Islamic scholars to seek extricable and Islamic-compliant solutions to 
resolve problems. Financial transactions are one of the subtle issues facing 
Muslims in the West. The majority of these Muslims either opt for such 
financial transactions, despite the fact that there is a clear injunction 
regarding illegality under Islamic law or avoid involvement in any transac-
tion tainted by usury (ribā), regardless of whether illegality is or is not 
clearly proven. In other words, we find Muslims at both ends of a broad 
spectrum: e.g., those who are not concerned with the legality of their 
actions in terms of Sharīʿah law and those who abstain from anything that 
might tarnish their faith regardless of actual illegality.
In any case, one can justify both choices. Muslims opting to make trans-
actions may adhere to the doctrines of intentionality, presumption of con-
tinuity (istișḥāb al-ḥal ) and necessity (ḍarūrah). Here, intentionality implies 
that, while one has good intentions, reality does not permit one to stick to 
the rules. Presumption of continuity subsumes under permissibility of any-
thing until proven otherwise. Necessity renders that which is unlawful legal 
under certain circumstances. However, necessity may not justify one’s 
action with the precept of precaution in religion. The relevant questions to 
ask are: does not Islamic law state that intention must corroborate with 
action; are there clear-cut texts regarding prohibition of interest; and are 
mortgages necessary? In other words, is home ownership essential, a neces-
sity or mere luxury? Regarding the latter, can a Muslim’s action be justified 
in light of the fact that, as now construed, mortgages and other financial 
transactions are not clear-cut issues, whereas continuity of certainty ( yaqīn) 
is one of the principle tenets upon which Islamic law rests.
1.1. Muslims in Britain
It is difficult to obtain exact figures but an estimate suggests that the Mus-
lim population in Great Britain numbers 1.4-1.8 million or 3% of the 
total population.1 The National Census in 2001 calculates 1.6 million 
1 Serena Hussain and Tufyal Choudhury, Muslims in EU: Cities Report United Kingdom, 
Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey, (UK: Open Society Institute, 2007) 
10-13. The Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamo-
phobia, Islamophobia—A Challenge for Us All, (London: The Runnymede Trust, 1997), 14, 
estimates a population of 1.2-1.4; the most recent estimate is 1.8 million. See The Guard-
ian, 17/6/2002. A recent article claims that the Muslim population has surged to 3 million; 
see Omar Masood, Jamel E. Chichti, Walid Mansour and Qazi Awais Amin, “Role of 
Islamic Mortgage in UK”, International Journal Monetary Economic and Finance, 2 (3/4) 
(2009) 368. 
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Muslims, 60% of whom are under the age of 30, living in Britain. Nearly 
one-half of Britain’s Muslim population was born in the UK. Moreover, 
huge numbers of Muslims are also currently studying or working in the 
UK; their number is nearly impossible to estimate because the British 
Government lists these immigrants by country of origin, not by religion.2
Because Islamophobia is on the rise in some areas, housing a Muslim 
family in such neighbourhoods could place them in imminent danger. In 
the run up to the 2001 general elections, the BNP (British National Party) 
focused its campaign on attacking Islam and the British Muslim 
community.3 During the elections, riots involving young Muslims erupted 
in the towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford where Muslim communi-
ties are predominant. Vandalism and verbal as well as physical abuse by 
white youths got out of hand as local BNP factions mounted their cam-
paigns for the general election. Commenting on this riot, the BNP leader 
Nick Griffin said that the riots were “not an Asian or Black problem, but a 
Muslim one”.4
1.2. British Muslim Assets in the UK
By 1998, a total of 176 Islamic banks were operating in 38 countries, 
according to the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB).5 These 
banks held assets worth $148 billion, with nearly $1.2 billion in aggregate 
net profits.6 Sir Howard Davies, former chairman of the Financial Services 
Authorities in the UK, said: “there was a gap in the market for retail sec-
tor Islamic banking products, which would cater to nearly two million 
UK Muslims”.7 Approximately 3 million Muslims are permanent residents 
in the UK (i.e., 50% of all UK ethnic minorities) with estimated savings 
of ca. £1 billion, while over 500,000 Muslims visited Britain in 2001, 
2 Hussain and Choudhury, supra note 1 at 7.
3 Serena Hussain and Tufyal Choudhury, “The situation of Muslims in the UK” in: 
Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection, (UK: Open Society Institute, 
2002) 377; at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/osi.pdf (last accessed 21/04/2010).
4 Ibid.; Interview on Newsnight, BBC 2, 26/6/2001; see also The Oldham “Riots”: Shat-
tering the Myths (London: BRAIN, 2001); see also N.M. Ahamed, F. Bodi, R. Kazim and 
M. Shadjareh, The Oldham Riots: Discrimination, Deprivation and Communal Tension in the 
United Kingdom (London: Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2001) 13.
5 Masood et al., supra note 1 at 368.
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.
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spending nearly £600 million.9 The liquid assets of the 5,000 wealthiest 
Muslims in the UK are estimated at over £3.6 billon. It is indicated that, 
among the estimated 1.65 million, 300,000 adult Muslims in the UK 
have annual incomes ≥ £30,00010 and that the number of wealthy British 
Muslims is rapidly growing.11 From this information, one can assume that 
25% of all adult Muslims are excellent prospects for banking and financial 
products (see Table 1).12
1.3. Condition of Muslims in Britain
Ethnic data reveal severe deprivation among Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
Muslim communities in all aspects of life: education, employment, hous-
ing, healthcare and access to justice.13 One-third of the Muslim population 
lives in the 10% most deprived neighbourhoods.14 The data also reveal that 
29% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils took ≥5 GCSE grade A+ to C-,
 8 This data is more than a decade old after which no new official census has been availa-
ble. It is predicted that today’s population might have increased more than 10% and that 
Muslim assets in Britain might have grown more than 2% as the demand and immigration 
status of Muslims in Britain is growing. 
 9 Birmingham Post, Birmingham, UK, 21/9/2002; John Duckerss, The Sunday Tele-
graph, London, UK, 3/11/2002, Jenny Knight 12.
10 See Table 1.
11 UK to encourage Islamic Mortgage, BBC Business News, 18/2/2002; at: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business /1826834.stm (last accessed: 27/3/2010 at 12:01 pm).
12 Masood et al., supra note 1 at 368.
13 Hussain and Choudhury, supra note 1 at 4.
14 Ibid., 7.
Table 1. Annual Income for UK Muslims
Age Bracket < £30k > £30k
18-24 244,470 56,138
25-34 154,421 61,453
35-44 194,977 95,515
45-54 159,122 55,758
55-64 108,259 22,972
≥65  70,925 2,005
Total 922,174 292,941
Source: Datamonitor, Policy Studies Institute, Labour Force Survey (1999).8
 L. Zakariyah / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 255-285 259
showing the lowest ever national average of 49%.15 One reason, among 
others, could be the calibre of people with whom Muslims must share a 
neighbourhood. It is alleged that the higher the calibre of people amongst 
whom one lives, the better the facilities and quality of amenities one 
encounters. This attitude also prevails in the UK. The standard level of 
education is very poor in some schools serving communities where lower 
calibre people live, in contrast to schools serving areas where professionals 
and people higher on the social ladder live.
Policy of catchments, feeder schools, family designations and admission 
to higher schools are firm practices in the UK. Although reports claim that 
children are protected against discrimination in schools, complaints can 
only be addressed when there is potential and an eminent population of 
Muslims in that catchment.16 Moreover, data indicate that ethnic minori-
ties suffer from low employment rates, with incomes below the minimum 
wage, compared with two-fifths of other ethnic minority households.
According to the National Census in 2001, a larger percentage of Mus-
lims owned their accommodations, paid by loan or mortgage, rather than 
other types of occupancy. Most British Pakistanis were less likely to report 
their occupancy profile, thus making it very difficult to create a unified 
profile for Muslim accommodations. By and large, “Muslims as a group 
share the experience of living in poor quality housing, whether owned or 
rented from the social or private sector.”17
The 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey for England found that, for 
the most part, respondents with a religious affiliation lived in areas with 
low to moderate levels of deprivation; the exceptions were respondents 
affiliated with the Muslim community. A significantly larger proportion of 
Muslim respondents lived in areas with the largest levels of deprivation.18
The quality of the homes occupied by Muslims also raises concerns. 
“The FNSEM found that, though all minority groups lived in poorer 
housing conditions, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have the highest 
level of overcrowding when compared with all other groups”.19 After the 
Oldham riots in 2001, a report by the Islamic Human Rights Commission20 
describes how British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis spent a longer time on 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 34.
17 Hussain and Choudhury, supra note 3 at 6 and 36.
18 Ibid., 32.
19 Ibid., 36.
20 Ibid., 34.
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waiting lists, were more likely to be offered lower-quality housing and were 
segregated into specific estates around the centre of the town.21 Poor hous-
ing and neighbourhoods leads to poor health facilities and inadequate 
social Islamic finance in the UK.
Britain has been familiar with Islamic financial market concepts in 
wholesales and high-net-worth investors since the 1980s, but major growth 
has only been witnessed during the last 5 years.22 Retail products in Islamic 
finance only appeared in the UK markets during the 1990s. The uncom-
petitive nature of such financial products and the inability to secure Gov-
ernment regulations, which renders these practices unprotected compared 
to other conventional products, causes these services to be unpopular and 
slow-growing amenities.23
Recently, tremendous changes have taken place within Islamic finance 
in Britain, both in wholesale and retail. Both the Government and private 
sector have expressed much more concern about the development of 
Islamic finance. London has been seen as a centre for the Islamic finance 
market. Some reasons for the rapid growth of Islamic finance are, i.e., the 
global expansion of Islamic finance, markets and skills base, Islamic win-
dows, excess liquidity in the Middle East, public policy and taxation, and 
a single financial regulator.24
In recognizing its potential input and development, UK financial regu-
lators such as the Bank of England and, since 1998, the FSA have begun 
paying more serious attention to Islamic Finance.25 In 1995, Lord Edward 
George, then Governor of the Bank of England, gave a significant lecture at 
the Conference on Islamic Finance organized by the Islamic Foundation in 
London. In his speech, Lord George recognized the potentiality of Islamic 
finance in the global economy and the need to integrate it into the context 
of London’s tradition of “competitive innovation”.26 This remark was first 
translated into practice in 2001 when a high-level working group chaired 
by Lord George was established to identify the obstacles facing Islamic 
21 Ahamed et al., supra note 4, 37.
22 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayekhi, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman and Ali Ravalia, 
Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges, Financial Services Authority, 9 Novem-
ber 2007; at: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/islamic_finance.pdf (last accessed 26/07/09 at 
09:04).
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 189-192.
25 Ibid., 8-10.
26 Ibid., 8.
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finance in Britain, one issue of which is the double stamp duty put on 
Islamic mortgages.27 In August 2004, the FSA authorized the Islamic Bank 
of Britain (IBB) as the first entirely Islamic retail bank in the country.28
1.4. Islamic Home Finance Products in Britain
Home financing in the UK is seen as the way to give citizens an opportu-
nity to climb the ladder towards home ownership. Thus, it is aimed at 
boosting their chances to have future assets because “paying the full value 
of the house upfront” is almost impossible for most citizens as the “house 
prices are above average people’s reach”.29
There are three major Islamic mortgage products in the UK which claim 
to be Sharīʿah-compliant contracts: namely, murābaḥah, ʾijārah wa iqtināʿ, 
and mushārakah mutanaqqisah.30 Murābaḥah can generally be described as 
the sale of an item at a disclosed profit margin.31 In the realm of mortgages, 
murābaḥah is implemented as follows. A prospective home buyer will 
approach a bank to buy from a seller a house that he desires for a price 
agreed upon with the bank. The bank will immediately resell it to the cus-
tomer at an agreed profit margin above the price of the house. The home 
buyer will pay for the property in instalments over an agreed period of 
years and mortgage the property to the bank in order to secure the instal-
ments that are due.32
ʾIjārah in Islamic jurisprudence is the rental/lease of an item, the orien-
tation of which is towards profit. ʾIjārah wa iqtināʿ/muntaha bi tamlīk is 
27 Ibid., 10-12.
28 Ibid., 14.
29 Masood et al., supra note 1 at 370. 
30 These three products are constantly being repackaged. Some merge mushārakah with 
ʾijārah or brand ʾijārah as lease ends with sale (ʾijārah al-muntaha bi tamlīk). See Ainley 
et al., supra note 22 at 20. Istisṇāʿ (future manufacturing) is the product under which a 
bank finances the construction of a house, including the agreement that the individual 
wishing to buy it will indeed do so. See Hans Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice 
(UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2009) 112. However, as far as the author is aware, this 
product has not yet been explored as means to provide mortgages in the UK.
31 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Ribā and its 
Contemporary Interpretation (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 1999) 76; Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. 
Hayes, III, Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk, and Return (Leiden: Brill, 2006) 182. 
32 Visser, supra note 30 at 107; Ainley et al., supra note 22 at 20; Ainley et al. at: www.
iibu.com/buy_home/buyhome.htm (last accessed 24/07/09 at 19:30); see also, Timothy 
Edmonds, Regulation of Financial Services (Land Transactions) Bill, Research Paper 05/50, 
17 June 2005-2006, Business and Transport Section, House of Commons, 18. 
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the rental of an item, which is ultimately sold to the client. In the case of 
ʾijārah wa iqtināʿ, home financing is implemented when the bank pur-
chases property for a client at an agreed price, first rents and thereafter sells 
it to the client at the end of a defined period of years at the price originally 
agreed upon when drawing up the contract. The client’s monthly pay-
ments to the bank will be twofold: one to pay the rent and the other to be 
held by the bank as assurance that the client will be financially able to 
purchase the property at the end of the rental period.33
Mushārakah mutanaqisah is a method of diminishing partnership uti-
lized by financier and home buyer alike, both entering into an agreement 
by which the bank buys the house with its greater capital, while the home 
buyer adds some share of the amount, from 10%. At the same time, the 
home buyer will enter another agreement with the financier to rent the 
property. The money he pays to the financier has a twofold purpose: one 
portion will pay his rent and another part will serve as amortization towards 
buying more shares from the financier. In the course of time, the financier’s 
share in the house will diminish while that of the home buyer will increase. 
In the end, the home buyer will hold all the shares and eventually become 
the sole owner of the property.34
The three models may sound straightforward in principle but there 
are observations, reservations and argumentations to be made on their 
legality/ḥalālity under Islamic law. Before proceeding, it is pertinent to 
mention that these three models are not equally practised in Britain. In 
fact, some products are more attractive than others, depending on how the 
financier packages the product.
Murābaḥah and ʾ ijārah mutanaqisah products are provided by one of the 
longest-established banks in Britain, the Ahli United Bank (AUBUK), for-
merly known as the United Bank of Kuwait.35 One major criticism of 
murābaḥah products is that the profit margin is calculated using the LIBRO 
(London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) or other conventional systems for the 
present value of the future interest payments. This causes Muslims to be 
sceptical and question whether the product is purely Islamic. Economi-
cally, murābaḥah does not enjoy the facility afforded conventional mort-
gages in the sense that interest payments on home finance are not 
33 Visser, supra note 30, 109.
34 Ibid., 111. 
35 Edmonds, supra note 32 at 18; ibid., 107-109.
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income-tax deductable.36 It is also observed that, although the transaction 
is straightforward, it is costly in the sense that it requires two transfers of 
property. Initially, two stamp duties were imposed on any murābaḥah 
product, but this has since been rectified. It is not surprising when some 
financiers decided to switch to another product.37
For ʾijārah wa iqtināʿ, the lease payment is geared towards an inter-
est rate and LIBOR is used as benchmark. Because the AUBUK reviews 
monthly payments each year, this casts a shadow of uncertainty on the 
product which might be considered gharar. Moreover, if the home owner, 
who bears the financial risk of a drop in the housing market, can no lon-
ger afford to make monthly payments, then the house will be sold by the 
financier.38 By and large, ʾijārah wa iqtināʿ, as it is now practised, cannot 
be considered Sharīʿah-compliant as it is neither sale nor rent but rather a 
mixture between the two which indulges gharar.39 In addition, this product 
is costly in the sense that it involves two sale transactions and two transfers 
of ownership. However, it is deemed suitable and more attractive from the 
financier’s perspective because, since 2004, it enjoys the added security of 
being regulated by the FSA alongside conventional mortgages.40
Mushārakah mutanaqisah might have offered the best and most straight-
forward product which could have been 100% Sharīʿah-compliant, were 
it not that the capital to buy the property in the first instance comes 
from interest-oriented shareholders (i.e., the financier). Also, mushārakah 
mutanaqisah is not offered on its own but rather in combination with 
ʾijārah.41 In the case of the Al-Buraq mushārakah mutanaqisah scheme 
in the UK, the bank purchases the client’s home property using its own 
capital plus a deposit provided by the client. Although the property is 
registered in the name of Al-Buraq at the Land Registry, the diminishing 
partnership contract splits the so-called ‘beneficial interest’ in the property 
between bank and client so as to reflect the ratio of their contributions to 
the purchase price. The client then lives on the property as a tenant and 
36 Visser, ibid., 107.
37 Ibid., 107-109.
38 http://www.iibu.com/buy_home/ijarahow.aspx viewed last 29/09/09 at 12.10 pm; 
see also Visser, supra note 30 at 110.
39 Visser, ibid., 110; Tarek el-Diwany (2003) at: www.isnacanada.comichc.htm.
40 Ainley et al., supra note 22 at 20; Visser, ibid., 110.
41 Therefore, the second product is no longer practicable since it can be embedded into 
mushārakah. No wonder that some financiers are now switching from ʾijārah to 
mushārakah.
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pays rent to the bank, the amount of which is adjusted to reflect that the 
client is part-owner with a beneficial interest in the property. In addition 
to paying rent, over time the client buys the bank’s beneficial interest in the 
property and eventually becomes full owner of that interest. At this stage, 
when the client no longer owes rent, ownership is formally transferred to 
the client’s name at the Land Registry. One should note that in some other 
diminishing partnership contracts, the property is held by the financier in 
trust for itself and for the client.42
1.5. Mortgage Dilemma for Muslims in the UK
Since 31 October 2004, the murābaḥah product has been defined as a 
mortgage contract regulated by the FSA.43 However, the ʾijārah product 
falls outside the scope of FSA mortgage regulations. It has been strongly 
suggested that it may be embedded in one of a number of definitions of a 
reversion plan.44 Timothy observes that “mortgage loans, whether struc-
tured as endowment policies or repayment mortgages, also have the repay-
ment of interest at their heart”.45 As such, this does not comply with 
Islamic law. Thus, Muslims in Britain face a dilemma in the sense that they 
are left with two options: i.e., either using a financial product which they 
find offensive to their religious principles, or choosing an alternate, more 
Sharīʿah-compliant arrangement, although not 100% compliant accord-
ing to the dictates of Islam.46
Apart from obstacles imposed by Islamic jurisprudence, many govern-
mental legislative constraints also complicate matters for Muslims. In his 
address at the Islamic Home Finance Seminar held in London in March 
2003, Lord George, former Governor of the Bank of England, highlighted 
“some of the obstacles to the growth of Islamic mortgage finance”:
42 Several other banks that are following suit and offering diminishing partnership in the 
UK are: United National Bank, HSBC, Lloyds TSB and the Islamic Bank of Britain. 
Although HSBC has been offering Islamic home finance in accordance with ʾijārah wa 
iqtināʿ principles, this has changed to mushārakah mutanaqqisah in recent times. See 
Haitham al-Haddad and Tarek el-Diwany, “The Islamic Mortgage: Paradigm Shift or Tro-
jan Horse?” (2006) at: http://www.islamic-finance.com/Islamic_mortgages.pdf, 2.
43 Edmonds, supra note 32 at 20.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 19.
46 Ibid., 18.
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(1)  Stamp duty because of the nature of the transaction, involving ini-
tial ownership by the financier, stamp duty may need to be paid 
twice (or even more frequently if the financier changes) or at a 
higher rate than for a conventional mortgage;
(2)  Higher regulatory capital charges where conventional mortgages—
and indeed murābaḥah mortgages—attract a capital risk weighting 
of 50%, some Islamic mortgages—ʾijārah—attract a higher rate of 
100%.
(3)  Disadvantages under various public sector home ownership 
schemes—such as Right to Buy or Rent to Mortgage where, because 
of the involvement of the financier as the owner of the property, the 
purchaser may be unable to take advantage of the benefits offered 
under the schemes.
(4)  Disadvantages in terms of the cost of housing element of income-
support or income-based job seekers Allowances compared with 
that which applies in the case of a conventional mortgage, with that 
cost element based upon interest rates on conventional mortgages.
The question also arises regarding legal costs. It remains unclear, in the case 
of an Islamic product, whether a single solicitor can advise both the finan-
cier and home buyer because of the financier’s role in ownership of the 
property.47
2. Role of Islamic Legal Maxims in the Mortgage Dilemma of Muslims 
in Britain
Islamic legal maxims are one of the sciences in Islamic jurisprudence which 
aphoristically subsume all the spectrums of Islamic Sharīʿah law. The sub-
ject matter is defined as “statements of principles that are derived from the 
detailed reading of the rules of fiqh on various themes”.48 Islamic scholars 
47 Sir Edward George, Speech to Islamic Home Finance Seminar, London, 27 March 
2003, quoted in Edmonds, supra note 32 at 19.
48 Muhammad Hashim Kamali, “Qawā‘id al-Fiqh: The legal maxims of Islamic law”, 
Journal of the Association of Muslim Lawyers, 3(2) (October 1998) at: www.aml.org.uk/
journal/ (last viewed 21/06/2006 14:03) 1; cf. Mawil Izz Dein, Islamic Law: From Historical 
Foundations to Contemporary Practice (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2004) 113-114; Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqā, Al-Madkhal al-Fiqhī al-ʿAmm, Vol. 2, 7th edn. 
(Damascus: Matbaʿah Jamiʿah, 1983/1383) 933.
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have agreed upon five basic Islamic legal maxims as tenets upon which 
Islamic law is based. Each of these five legal maxims has several sub-maxims 
which function either as exegeses to the grand maxim or provide condi-
tions and restriction to it. These five legal maxims are: (1) the role inten-
tion plays in Muslim actions (al-ʾumūr bi maqāsịdihā); (2) the evaluation 
of certainty and doubt in evidence (al-yaqīn lā yazūl bi l-shakk); (3) the 
facility guaranteed in the face of hardship (al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taysīr); 
(4) Islamic law’s preference in eliminating harm (al-ḍarar yuzāl ); and 
(5) the locus standi of custom (al-ʿādah muḥakkamah).49
Each of these maxims will be dealt with in relation to financial transac-
tions in Islamic law, specifically home finance products. By and large, these 
maxims will be studied with regard to transactions from the overall objec-
tives of Islamic law and suggestions will be given on whether existing 
mortgage products, be they conventional or acclaimed Islamic, are worthy 
of acquisition by Muslims in Britain, based on the circumstances under 
which they are living.
2.1. Maxim of Intention and Action
In Islamic law, intention is an important criterion for determining whether 
an action is lawful or unlawful.50 The Islamic legal maxim coded to deal 
with intentionality in action is al-ʿumūr bi maqāsịdā (“Actions are consid-
ered together with their intentions”).51 This is one of the five basic legal 
maxims agreed upon by Islamic scholars because of its consistency with 
and relevance to Islamic jurisprudence. It implies that any action, whether 
physical or verbal, should be interpreted according to the individual’s 
intention. Islamic jurists have provided much textual evidence to justify 
the legality of this maxim. The most authentic direct evidence is the Ḥadīth 
reported by many traditionalists, particularly Al-Bukhārī and Muslim, in 
49 Abdul Rahman al-Suyūtị̄, Al-Ashbah wa l-Nazāʾir (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
1983/1403); Zayn al-Abidin Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah wa l-Nazāʾir ʿalā Madhhab Abī 
Ḥanifah al-Nuʾman (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1993/1413); Muhammad Siddiq 
al-Burnu, Al-Wājiz fī ‘Idah Qawāʾid al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kulliyyah, 5th edn. (Beirut: Muhassa-
sah al-Risalah, 2002/1422); Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqā, Sharh al-Qawāʾid al-Fiqhiyyah, 
2nd edn., (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1989/1389).
50 Sobhi Rajab Muhamassani, Falsafat al-Tashrīʿ fī l-Islam (The Philosophy of Jurispru-
dence in Islam, (trans.) Farhat J. Ziadeh) (Kuala Lumpur: The Open Press, 2000) 160.
51 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 8; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 27; Ahmad al-Hamawi, 
Ghamz ʿUyūn al-Basair Sharh al-Ashbaʾ wa Nazārir, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyyah,1985/1405) 37.
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which the Prophet is reported to have said: “Actions are judged according 
to intentions”.52
This maxim relates to matters where the legal ruling is based on both 
action and intention. Conversely, within the Islamic legal framework, 
some rulings can be established only considering intention, such as will-
ingness to perform ritual duties, which in fact implies that intention can 
be considered without the involvement of action. However, in most cases 
or as a fundamental principle, the essence of intention is ostensibly effec-
tive when coupled with action. Al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) emphasizes that 
“al-asḷ ‘anna l-niyyah idhā tajarrad ʿan al-ʿamal lā takun muʾaththirah [ fī 
l-ʿumūr al-duniyawiyyah]” (“Fundamentally there is no effect for intention 
devoid from act [in worldly matters]”.53 This is because intention is not 
being overtly expressed or physically executed and it is applicable to mun-
dane matters.54 Thus, if an action is coupled with intention, that act will be 
judged with regard to its intention.
Unlike ritual practices where intention is paramount to the validity of 
the action, in mu‘amalah (Islamic commercial transaction), intentions are 
considered essentially to exist and regulate other elements of action,55 
because Islamic transactions are not originally meant to invoke ritual 
behaviour but rather “to bring a religious evaluation system to bear on 
ordinary life.”56
Much has been written about the importance of intention in Islamic 
transactions in general and in commercial exchange in particular. Baber 
Johansen has discussed in great detail the effects of Islamic transactions. 
His work elusively exposes the importance accorded to action in Islamic 
‘commercial transactions’ as opposed to ‘social transactions’. As Baber 
explains, in the latter, the risk is significant in terms of social disruption if 
intention has to play a vital role and firm decisions have to be made while 
in the former they do not.57
52 Al-Bukhārī, Sạḥīḥ Bukhārī, Ḥadīth No. 1; Muslim, Sạḥīḥ Muslim, Ḥadīth No. 1599.
53 Al-Sarkhasī, Al-Mabsut, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.) 239.
54 Muhammad Siddiq Al-Burnu, Mawsuʾa al-Qawāʾid al-Fiqhiyyah, Vol. 1 (n.p., 1416 
H) 159.
55 Paul R. Powers, Intent in Islamic Law: Motive and Meaning in Medieval Sunni Fiqh, 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006) 97-98.
56 Ibid., 97; cf. Baber Johansen, “Valorization of the Human Body in Muslim Sunni 
Law”, in: J.J.S. Devin, Baber Johansen and Amy Singer (Eds.), Law and Society in Islam 
(Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), 71. 
57 Ibid., 71-93.
268 L. Zakariyah / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 255-285
Discussions on the Islamic legal maxim involving intention centre 
around financial mortgages and the maxim’s legal effect on contractual 
agreements: i.e., intention and the meaning stipulated in the agreement or 
the wording expressed in the agreement? Because Islamic scholars hold dif-
fering opinions, as a result the legal maxim invoked to deal with the mat-
ter also varies. Ḥanbalī, Mālikī and Ḥanafī jurisprudence say that effect 
is given to intention and the meaning in a contractual agreement, not 
only the wording and formation of expressions. Whereas, Ḥanafī58 and 
Al-Shāfi‘ī scholars add a question mark to emphasize that the principle 
is not always applicable.59 Thus, the maxim coined thus : Hal-l-ʿibrah fī 
l-ʿuqūd bi l-maqāsịd wa l-maʿānī aw li l-alfazh wa l-mabānī (“In a con-
tract, should effect be given to intentions and meanings or the words 
and forms”).60
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 1350 CE), a Ḥanbalī jurist, is thus quoted:
Should the law take into account only the manifest meaning of expressions and con-
tracts even when the purposes and intents (al-maqāsịd wa l-niyāt) appear to be other-
wise? Or do aims and intents (al-qusụ̄d wa l-niyāt) have an effect which requires paying 
attention to them and taking them into consideration? The evidence of the Law 
(ʿadillāt al-sharʿ) and its rules concur that intentions in a contract determine whether 
the contract is legal or illegal.61
58 Especially Abū Ḥanifah, as opposed to his two companions: Abū Yusuf (d. 767) and 
Al-Shaybanī (d. 804). The two uphold the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī viewpoints. See Al-Kasani, 
Badaʾi, Vol. 4, 190, and Vol. 5, 169, quoted in: Oussama Arabi, (200-223) “Intention and 
Method in Sanhuri’s Fiqh: Cause as Ulterior Motive”, Journal of Islamic Law and Society, 
4(2) (1997) 213-214.
59 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 166; Al-Zarkashi, Al-Manthur fī l-Qawāʾid, Vol. 2, 371; 
Ibn Rajab, Al-Qawāʾid, Art. 38.
60 This maxim is re-coined from the maxim: “Al-ʿIbrah fī l-ʿUqūd bi l-maqāsịd wa 
l-maʿanī lā bi l-Alfadh wa l-mabanī” (“effect is given to intentions and meaning in con-
tracts, not words and forms”) as agreed upon by Ḥanafī and Mālikī (see Ibn Nujaym, supra 
note 49 at 207; Al-Majallah, Art. 3) as opposed to the view of Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanbalī which 
opines differently depending on the matter at hand. At times emphasis is on the meaning 
while at other times on the word. See Al-Ramali, Nihayah al-Muhtaj, Vol. 6 (Beirut: Dār 
al-Fikr, 1984/1404) 242; Al-Buhuti, Kashshaf al-Qina, Vol. 3 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1402) 
446. My opinion inclines to separation between issues when applying this maxim since 
there is no uniqueness in the forms that different issues take.
61 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Iʿlam al-Muwaqqiʾin ʿan Rabb al-ʿAlāmīn, Vol. 3 (Cairo: Al-
Muniriya Press) 96-98; O. Arabi, supra note 58, 218.
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From Ibn Qayyim’s assertion, any intent that contradicts the tenet of the 
law should be pronounced null and void. Thus, he exemplifies:
If one sells a weapon to someone whom he knows will use it to kill a Muslim; then the 
sale is forbidden and invalid as it promotes crime and aggression; however, the sale is 
valid if he sells the weapon to someone engaged in holy war in Allāh’s way.62
Ḥanafī and Al-Shāfi‘ī scholars opine that legal procedure is given more 
consideration than hidden motives. According to Imām Al-Shāfi‘ī in his 
‘magnum opus’, regarding the legality of hidden motives:
The principle I follow is that any contract which is valid appearance, I do not nullify 
on the grounds of suspecting the parties: I validate it by the validity of its appearance; 
I take their intention to be reprehensible, if—were it made explicit—that intention 
would invalidate the sale. Thus I reprehend the purchase of the sword by a man if he 
plans to kill with it. Yet its sale by the vendor to the man who kills unjustly with it is 
not prohibited.63
While the two contrasting views are unanimous on the invalidity of a con-
tract in which intention explicitly contradicts the Islamic law, Ḥanafī and 
Al-Shāfi‘ī jurists are more ready “to inquire into the real intentions of the 
parties as long as the explicit terms of the contract are formally within the 
bounds of the law.”64 Mālikī and Ḥanbalī points of view incline towards 
the ethical moral responsibility of contracting parties. Little wonder that 
the two schools oppose the use of hiyah (legal stratagems) that ostensibly 
violate the spirit of the law.65 Thus, if one intends to practice usury (ribā) 
by means of a sale contract, then he has committed usury from which the 
forms of sale (sụrāt al-bayʿ) does not absolve him.66
The maxim in question forms the basis for the argument that in con-
tractual agreements the parties’ intended meanings may possibly differ. 
More specifically, in today’s relevant practices, a devout Muslim who 
intends to own a house in which to live and raise his family in a noble and 
Islamic environment may find himself in a system where the conventional 
usage of expression contradicts his faith. In other words, the form and 
62 Ibn Qayyim, ibid., 96-98.
63 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 3, 65, quoted by Sanhur, Masdar, Vol. 4, 57-58; Arabi, supra 
note 58, 212.
64 Arabi, ibid., 215. 
65 Ibid., 220. 
66 Ibn Qayyim, supra note 61 at 98; Arabi, ibid., 220. 
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expressions in a bank’s contractual agreement may be ignored or re-inter-
preted to create a legitimate meaning in accordance to Islamic law.
The dilemma in this assertion, however, lies in the fact that the bank 
does not own a house to sell. How can it profit from something that it does 
not possess in light of the Ḥadīth that unequivocally denounces such a 
practice: lā tabiʿ mā laysa indak (“Sell not what is not with you”).67 Fur-
thermore, another question related to the above suggestion regards the use 
of ‘interest’ that has become a conventional meaning denoting usury which 
is forbidden under Islamic law. It has already been mentioned but will be 
discussed later how the word ‘interest’ replaced ‘usury’ which has from the 
beginning been prohibited in Islam. Nevertheless, if the word ‘interest’ has 
become conventional and the product offered which includes interest is 
purely Islamic, should it still be prohibited? Fundamentally, the effect of 
an utterance is based on the intended meaning of the speaker in any matter. 
However, because of the broad scope of muʾāmalah in Islamic jurispru-
dence and the flexible rules accorded it to consolidate practices down 
through the generations, the majority of Islamic scholars, including Ḥanafī, 
Mālikī and some Al-Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanbalī versions, agreed that effect is given 
to the intended meaning, not to the form and expression in which the 
contract is drawn up. For example, if Mr. A buys property from Mr. B and 
says to him “take this item as a trust until I return to pay for the property” 
then that item will be considered as rahn (mortgage). Thus the word ‘trust’ 
will be disregarded as the intended meaning of the depositor of the item is 
to render something as security for the property he bought.
In conventional and Islamic mortgages, if the agreement is based on 
murābaḥah or bayʿ muʿajjal (deferred sale), the bank or financier has the 
right to repossess the property if the buyer defaults. However, today West-
ern banks have gone a step further. Banks sell money, not property. More-
over, they add interest to the money they lend out which is considered 
usury in Islam. The fact of the matter is, however, that a Muslim borrower 
may equate the money which the bank loans him/her as property under 
the pretext of his/her intentionality; the added interest can then be seen as 
profit the bank makes upon selling the property to him at a higher price.
67 This ḥadith is reported by Abu Dawud in Sunan ḥadith no. 3503, see Muhammad 
Hashim Kamali, Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futures and Options, (Cambridge: 
The Islamic Text Society, 2003) 112. There are different interpretations of this Ḥadīth (see 
pp. 112-115).
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From the above, one can deduce that when a Muslim hides his/her 
intention by construing the term ‘interest’ to mean ‘profit’ in a mortgage 
contract, be it conventional or Islamic, this act will be considered morally 
reprehensible to adherents of Mālikī, Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī schools while 
perhaps acceptable to those advocating Al-Shāfi‘ī, and Abū Ḥanifa views. 
This may suggest that, because there is disagreement rather than consensus 
about a contract’s legality when devoid of explicit intention, the door 
remains ajar for further dialogue on the issue of contemporary mortgages 
and their legality.
2.2. Maxim of Certainty and Doubt
Another vibrant mechanism for evaluating the legality of current mortgage 
practices is to study whether the mortgage system creates certainty or 
uncertainty. The second basic legal maxim called upon to do this is al-yaqīn 
lā yazūl bi l-shakk (“certainty cannot be repelled with doubt”).68 According 
to Al-Zarqā: “the importance of this maxim is unlimited because there is 
no part of fiqh to which it is not applicable”.69 What is certain in Islamic 
commercial law is the presumption of legality and permissibility of trad-
ing: i.e. al-asḷ fī l-buyʿ muʿāmalāt al-hill wa l-hibah70 which can be inferred 
from Qur’ānic verse 2:18 in which Allāh says: “wa ahall Allāh al-bayʿ 
(“. . . and Allāh makes the sale lawful”)”.
In muʿamalāh, it is certain that a sale in any form is lawful. In other 
words, the fundamental principle of trading is its lawfulness: al-asḷ fī l-bayʿ 
al-hill. As the scope of commercial transactions broadens, the general rul-
ing is permissibility except where texts clearly declare otherwise. Other 
than that nothing in them is forbidden. Ibn Taymiyyah contends that 
“Allāh Most High never prohibited a contract which is beneficial to Mus-
lims and does not inflict harm upon them.”71 This inevitably includes sub-
stantial mortgage contracts, money exchange and money transfer, if devoid 
of any malpractice.72 In support of the fundamental legality of business 
68 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 55; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 59; Al-Majallah, Art. 4; 
Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 79; Al-Zarqā, supra note 48 at 574; Al-Burnu, supra note 49 
at 166.
69 Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 78-80.
70 Kamali, supra note 67 at 66-67. 
71 Ibid., quoting from Ibn Tamiyyah, Taqi al-Din, Nazariyyah al-‘Aqd (Beirut: Dār al-
Ma‘rifah, 1317 AH), 226.
72 Ibid., at 66-70.
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transactions in Islam, the maxim of freedom of liability or al-asḷ barā 
l-dhimmah (“The fundamental principle is freedom of liability”)73 and 
al-asḷ al-ʿadam (“The fundamental principle is non-existence of something”)74 
are cited by jurists. The bases for all these maxims can be inferred from 
many verses in the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth of the Prophet. The Qur’ān thus 
states: “We have subjugated to you all that is in the heavens and the earth” 
(Q45:13); “He it is who created for you all that is on the earth” (Q2:29); 
“Allāh has explained to you in detail what is forbidden to you unless you 
are compelled to it (Q6:119); etc. These and other verses are clear injunc-
tions that fundamentally state that all that Allāh created for human beings 
for social utilities are lawful. Allāh Most High further declares explicitly 
what is prohibited and that it “needs to be clear and specific”.75
Having said that, the reasons current mortgage contracts are branded 
un-Islamic subsumes in the way and manner they are being conducted. In 
other words, here the margin of ḥarāmity is the interest added to money 
borrowed by the person taking out a mortgage. El-Diwany gives some 
reasons why the system, even Islamic finance, is not Islamic. His observa-
tions can be summarized thus:
•  Islamic mortgage rates are fixed just like in conventional mortgages.
•  Banks are regulated not to lose money on the deal in case the Benefi-
ciary defaults.
•  Islamic financial banks mix systems, using conventional products 
with the hope of Islamising them although nothing has changed “over 
40 years”.
•  Fixing financial rates of return in advance using the Islamic triple 
contract.76
In addition to El-Diwany’s observations, another problem exists because 
banks that offer such divergent modified forms of Islamic home financing 
usually borrow (at interest on the money market) the money they use to 
purchase the property in the first leg of the murābaḥah transaction, which 
indeed is prohibited under Islamic law. Moreover, the profit rate is pre-
73 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 52; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 59; Al-Majallah, Art. 8.
74 Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 107-100.
75 Kamali, supra note 67 at 67; Mohammad al-Bashir Muhammad al-Amine, “ ‘Istisṇāʿ 
and its application in Islamic Banking”, Arab Law Quarterly, 16(1) (2001) 27. 
76 Tarek el-Diwany, “Islamic banking isn’t Islamic” at: http://www.islamic-finance.com/
item100_f.htm (last accessed 23/03/2010 at 16:15).
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determined.77 But one must ask the question if ḥarām (i.e., interest paid by 
the bank to finance the property) and ḥalāl (i.e., gain that the home-buyer 
will derive from the property) collide, which of the two will supersede? The 
majority of Islamic scholars opine that the aspect of ḥarām (prohibited) 
will supersede as the maxim states: idhā ijtamaʿ al-ḥalāl wa l-ḥarām gullib 
al-ḥarām.78 According to Al-Sarakhsī: al-akhdh bi l-iḥtịyāt fī l-ribā wājib 
(“Inclining to preclusion in ribā is obligatory”).79
Another uncertainty in current Islamic mortgages can be found in the 
IBB products ʾijārah and ʾijārah wa mushārakah mutanaqqisah. On its 
website, after welcoming clients and introducing its alleged Islamic prod-
ucts, the IBB states conditions and rules which place the ḥalālity of prod-
uct under scrutiny.80 One can infer from IBB’s ʾijārah or Home Purchase 
Plan that the bank is still using conventional norms which creates a 
dilemma for Muslims who are conscious of their faith.
All in all, while there are ambiguities in the ḥalālity of the present mort-
gage products, there is need for flexibility in dealing with the current 
financial sector, especially home finance, when it comes to the needs of the 
Muslims living in the West. This hypothesis is subsumed under the pretext 
of the maxim that will be detailed below.
2.3. Maxim of Hardship and Facility
To some extent the pretext of hardship or necessity, if anything, can be used 
convincingly to justify current mortgage products either under conven-
tional or purported Islamic financiers. The issue of necessity to have a mort-
gage results from compassionate considerations regarding Muslims living 
in a non-conducive environment. A survey of Muslims dwelling in rented 
or council houses shows that the level of juvenile delinquency is higher 
than in areas where inhabitants are home owners.81 This fact introduces a 
concern for how Islam requires Muslims to raise their offspring. Without 
77 Rodney Wilson, Islamic Finance in Europe, MUSMIN, RSCS Policy Papers, 2 (2007) 16.
78 Al-Zarkashi, Vol. 1, supra note 59 at 15; Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 105; Ibn Nujaym, 
supra note 49 at 109.
79 Al-Burnu, supra note 54 at 201.
80 See: http://www.islamic-bank.com/islamicbanklive/HomeFinance/1/Home/1/Home.
jsp (last accessed 24/03/2010 at 20:45). Among its astonishing conditions are the right of 
the bank to change the margin on any of its products after the contract has been completed 
and the statement that the home is at risk should the client fail to pay the fees due.
81 The 2011 National Census may suggest an improvement but the result has not yet 
been published. 
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doubt, protecting and raising offspring well is one of the five fundamental 
necessities of life.
Many maxims are related to the issue of necessity in Islamic transac-
tions. One of the basic legal maxims upon which many others are founded 
is al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taysīr (“Hardship begets facility”).82 This maxim is 
used as a legal concession for any recognized hardship in Islamic law and 
thus serves to lessen and remove people’s burdens.83 The legality of this 
maxim, and its subdivisions, is based on the overall objectives of Islamic 
law extrapolated from various textual evidence.84 The Prophet is reported 
to have said: “The religion is very easy and whoever overburdens himself in 
his religion will not be able to continue in that way.”85
The relevance of this and such maxims to Islamic transactions in general 
and to Islamic and conventional mortgages in particular lies in the fact 
that, even where the prohibition of ribā is clearly evident, one can assert 
that Muslims in Britain face difficulties in settling in an ideal environment 
suitable for raising model, exemplary families. Thus, they have religious 
concession to breach the dictates of the text calling for the protection and 
prevention of their ḍarūriyyah al-khamsah (five necessities).
Al-Suyūtị̄ puts forward seven reasons for which facility and legal conces-
sions are given, among others, al-usr wa ʿumūm al-balwa (“difficulty and 
general calamity”).86 From this one can argue that it is impossible to avoid 
ribā if one wants to own a home, particularly in the Western world, either 
using conventional or Islamic ways to finance. Apart from what has been 
explained above, money used either by Islamic or conventional banks is 
provided through an interest-based system, with the calculated profit mar-
gin based on the market’s rate of interest. Kamali argues “that people (of 
this generation) are in greater need of taysīr [. . .] than ever before”.87 As 
Kamali explains, conditions in modern society are so overwhelming in the 
sense that people are lured into the temptation to sin. Therefore, the 
Islamic provision for the concession to alleviate hardship becomes utterly 
82 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 76; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 74; Al-Zarkashi, Vol. 3, 
supra note 59 at 169; Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 157; supra note 50 at 152.
83 Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 85; Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 436-454.
84 See, among others, Qur’ān 2:185, 22:78, 4:28, 5; 5:7, and 2:286.
85 Al-Bukhārī, supra note 52, Kitāb al-Imām, Ḥadīth No. 39.
86 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 77.
87 Kamali, supra note 67 at 71.
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necessary to ease conditions.88 Thus, giving provisions in the face of hard-
ship and difficulty is of paramount importance.
Therefore one must proportionally and appropriately contend with this 
ambit of difficulties from within the spirit of Islamic law. A set principle in 
Islamic law says: idhā dāqa l-amr ittasaʿ wa idhā ittasaʿa dāqa (“Whenever 
the circle of an affair narrows it is widened and whenever it widens it is 
narrowed”).89 The essence of this maxim is to place emphasis on the grand 
maxim while giving additional information on how to apply it. In sum-
mary one can say that where there is apparent mashaqqah (hardship), in 
any matter, there should also be a provision for it. As soon as mashaqqah 
disappears, the matter shall revert to its original rule. In other words, as 
Ahmad al-Zariqa (d. 1357) puts it, if necessity and hardship cause facility, 
the facility should be enjoyed until the condition changes; then one should 
revert to the normal rule.90
Although home purchase schemes, be they mushārakah mutanaqqisah, 
murābaḥah or ʾ ijārah wa tamlīk, are not purely Islamic as critics claim, they 
still serve the very purpose of Islamic law by offering, especially poor, peo-
ple with limited initial capital the opportunity to own their homes. Thus, 
such schemes promote social welfare, and any such measure is considered 
as serving the masḷaḥah and hence desirable.91 According to Al-Ghazālī, 
“the very objectives of the Sharīʿah are to promote the welfare of the peo-
ple, which lies in safeguarding their faith, lives, intellect, posterity and 
wealth. Whatever ensures the safeguarding of these five [elements] serves 
public interest and is desirable”.92 But, is owning a home masḷaḥah, or liv-
ing under shelter? Is it permissible to use the concept masḷaḥah for some-
thing which is not classified as a necessity? If mortgage in Britain is thought 
to promote the welfare of citizens, including the Muslim minority, as 
indeed it is, then we must explore how the concept masḷaḥah can be used 
88 Ibid. 
89 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 83; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 84; Al-Majallah men-
tioned first part of the maxim in Art. 18; Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 165; Al-Burnu, supra 
note 49 at 230.
90 Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 163; Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 230.
91 Ahamad Kameel, Mydin Meera and Dzuljastri Abdul Razak, Islamic Home Financing 
through Mushārakah Mutanaqisah and al-Bayʿ bi Thaman Ajil Contracts: A Comparative 
Analysis, p. 19. At http://www.isra.my/media-centre/downloads/summary/7/10.html (last 
accessed: 11/05/2010).
92 Ihya al-Ghazālī, quoted in Kameel et al., ibid., 19; see also Umer Chapra, Islam and 
Economic Challenge, Cambridge: The Islamic Foundation, 1992).
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to justify the lesser evil of existing Islamic home purchase products since 
there is no alternative at the moment. However, such rules may not be 
admissible in other environments where other avenues are available to 
achieve masḷaḥah.
Ahamed et al. stress that is it essential to own a home in which to dwell 
for the purpose of shelter: “Home is a basic necessity for human life. Every-
one needs a shelter for rest, sleep, comfort and protection from sun and 
rain. It is a place to dwell in comfort with family. Therefore, owning a good 
home is an aspiration of everyone”.93 From their assumption one can infer 
that Ahamed et al. place home ownership under the concept ‘necessity’ 
which could render lawful that which is unlawful. One could compassion-
ately suggest that, since the overall objectives of Islamic law aim to protect 
the five fundamental principles of life, having any type of home planning 
(mortgage) would be highly recommended if not compulsory because, if a 
Muslim neglects these principles, the spirit of the Sharīʿah will automati-
cally decline.
Another question worth answering is whether having a house is a need 
or necessity. From the perspective of Islamic law, al-ḥājah (need) is consid-
ered al-ḍarūrah (necessity) as the maxim says: al-ḥājah tunazzil manzila 
l-ḍarūrah ‘ammah kānat aw khassah (“Need, whether of public or private 
nature, is considered as necessity”).94 The meaning of al-ḥājah (need) is of 
a lesser degree than al-ḍarūrah (necessity). Strictly, what Islam aims to pro-
vide for humanity can be classified in three categories:
(1)  What is termed al-ḍarūrah (necessity). Ḍarūrah is a situation where 
a person’s life, dignity, religion, offspring, and property would be 
endangered if he/she refused to commit an unlawful act. For this 
reason, a person is allowed to violate the rules to protect those 
things.95
(2)  What is termed al-ḥājah (needs). This is a situation where a person 
could encounter difficulty or hardship if he/she does not commit an 
unlawful act, although his/her life will not be in danger. It is recom-
mended that such difficulty be prevented by committing what is 
unlawful. According to Ibn Qayyim (d. 751 AH) in an attempt to 
93 Kameel et al., supra note 90 at 2. 
94 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 88; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 91; Al-Majallah, Art. 32; 
Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 242.
95 Ali Haydar, Ḍurar al-Ḥukkām, Vol. 1, 38.
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draw a demarcation between ḍarūrah and ḥājah, claims that ḥājah 
is what is prohibited as a preventive measure (sadd al-dhariʿ) and 
becomes permissible for public interest while what is prohibited 
with definite purpose can only be permissible by virtue of necessity.96 
However, according to the maxim in question, ḥājah is regarded as 
ḍarūrah in some circumstances.97
(3)  What is termed al-kamāliyyah or al-taḥsīniyyah (luxury). This is 
exemplified by a situation where a person seeks something excessive 
to maximize enjoyment of his own life.
The first and second categories concern rights protected and provided for 
by Islam. The third category, however, is beyond discussion. Thus, if one 
breaks the law in order to enhance one’s own luxurious lifestyle, then he/
she will be in transgression and violation of the rules of Allāh. Therefore, 
placing money in excess of the capital needed to mortgage a house can be 
considered a luxury and thus regarded as unlawful. However, extra money 
for essential things needed to make the house suitable for living can be 
included in the first two categories.
Be that as it may, the rule that permits use of the provision of necessity 
is not boundless. Other maxims act as its check and balance. The maxim 
al-ḍarūrah tuqaddar bi qadrihah (“Necessities are estimated according to 
their quantity”)98 is set as condition and restriction to regulate the use of 
the provision of facility in the case of necessity. As mentioned above, the 
Qur’ān has categorically stated that the only acceptable excuse for breaking 
rules is reasonable and genuine necessity: ghayra bāghin wa lā ʿādin (“with-
out wilful disobedience, nor transgressing due limits”).99 Any facility given 
should be minimized to curb abusive use of the pretext necessity. Thus, the 
excess in having a mortgage in the conventional system renders the action 
unlawful. In other words, under the ribā system, a Muslim is not allowed 
to have more than one mortgage, which would surpass the ambit of neces-
sity. However, if the mortgage is contracted according to Islamic principles, 
the number of houses one can own is unlimited since this is classified 
under lawful trading. For example, if the size of someone’s family is too 
96 Ibn Qayyim, supra note 61 at 119.
97 Cf. Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqāt, Vol. 2, 8; Al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustasfa, (2) 481; Al-Amidi, 
Al-Iḥkam fī Usụ̄l al-Aḥkām, (3) 393-396; Al-Razi, Al-Mahsul fī ʿIlm al-Usụ̄l, Vol. 2, 578.
98 Al-Majallah, Art. 22; Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 239.
99 Cf. Qur’ān 2:173, 6:145, and 16:115.
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large to fit into one apartment, then more housing can be sought as this 
falls under the realm of necessity.
The yardstick for determining the proportion of facility to be granted 
under the pretext necessity is the five necessities recognized by law: i.e., 
religion, life, dignity, offspring, and property and that which would be 
required to preserve them.100 However, it is also worth noting that the 
amount taken from prohibited things to protect these five necessities is 
relative because what is deemed necessary sustenance in one situation may 
not be sufficient in another case.
2.4. Maxim of Prohibition and Elimination of Harm
The fourth basic legal maxim is al-ḍarar yuzāl (“Harm should be removed”).101 
This maxim is based primarily on the Ḥadīth of the Prophet (lā ḍarar wa 
lā ḍirār: “No injury/harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated)102 and the gen-
eral extrapolation of many textual evidence that prohibit inflicting harm 
and seeking for its elimination, i.e., “. . . After payment of legacies and 
debts: So that no loss (harm) is caused (to anyone)”.103
It is reported that a man approached the Prophet complaining about 
another man who planted a tree on his land, causing harm to the owner of 
the land. The Prophet asked the man to take the landowner’s compensa-
tion for his tree or to give it to the landowner as a gift. When the man 
refused both options, the Prophet asked the landowner to destroy the tree, 
saying to the tree’s owner “you are harming someone”.104
In anticipating and preventing any ḍarar which might destroy a Muslim 
family, one fundamental principle of Islamic law says that one should seek 
and use any means within the ambit of Sharīʿah law to prevent the occur-
rence of ḍarar. The maxim put forward is al-ḍarar yudfaʿdiqadar al-imkān 
100 See Al-Ghazālī, Vol. 1, supra note 97, 139-140; Muhammad Muslehuddin, Philoso-
phy of Islamic Law and the Orientalists, 2nd edn. (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications 
Ltd., 1980) 163.
101 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 83; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 85.
102 Al-Majallah, Art. 19; Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 83; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 
at 85.
103 See Qur’ān 4:12, 4:5 and 2:233.
104 Abū Dāwūd, Sunān Abū Dāwūd with Sharh, Vol. 15, 321-322; Ibn Taymiyyah, 
Majmūʿ al-Futawā, Vol. 4, 47, and Vol. 28, 104; Muhammad Ibn Muflih, in: Abū Zahraha 
Hazim (Ed.), Al-Furuʾ, (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah 1418) (4) 219.
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(“Ḍarar should be prevented as much as possible”)105 because it is better to 
prevent than to cure harm. Although it is legally preferable to eliminate 
ḍarar without causing any further ḍarar, should that prove to be difficult, 
then harm must be proportionate.
Having said that, in the course of eliminating ḍarar one important mea-
sure should be considered: i.e., the means of averting ḍarar should not 
cause more ḍarar. However, causing another ḍarar can exceed or be equiv-
alent to the present ḍarar. The maxim al-ḍarar lā yuzāl bi mithlihi (“Harm 
is not repelled by its like”)106 emphasizes averting an equivalent ḍarar. 
However, in the course of eliminating ḍarar, it is expected that—in one 
way or another—more ḍarar is likely to emerge. If both are harmful, one 
includes a higher degree of harm than the other. If both possess the same 
degree of evil or harm, then the doer is given the choice to select what is 
suitable for him, provided that no other people’s rights are affected. How-
ever, if one of the two is lesser than the other, the lesser ḍarar should be 
committed to avoid greater ḍarar as the next maxim will demonstrate.107 
The maxims that address this issue are coined al-ḍarar al-ashadd yuzāl bi 
l-ḍarar al-akhaff (“Greater injury should be prevented by committing 
lesser injury”).108 Qur’ān verse 2:219 unequivocally states: “If they ask you 
concerning alcoholic drink and gambling. Say ‘In them is great sin, and 
(some) benefit for men, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit’.” 
Because of their greater sin, Allāh forbids both alcohol and gambling. This 
verse stands as evidence that, if there is evil (inferred from the word ithm) 
as well as benefits (manāfiʿ), then evil should be obviated by not acquiring 
the benefit except where the benefit is greater than the evil, as the verse 
explains that ithm is greater than manāfiʿ.109
105 Al-Majallah, Art. 31; Al-Zarqā, supra note 48 at 587; Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 
256.
106 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 86; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 87; Ibn Muflih, Al-
Mubdi‘ (Beirut: Dār al-Maktab al-Islamī, 1400), (4) 301; Al-Zarkashi, Vol. 2, supra note 59 
at 321; Ibn Taymiyah, Majmūʿ al-Futawā (29) 189.
107 Ali Haydar, Sharh al-Majallah, Vol. 1, 35; Al-Atasii, Ḍurar al-Hukkam Sharh al-
Majallah, (Damascus: Hams Press, 1349), (1), 63.
108 Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 88; Al-Majallah, Art. 28; cf. “lesser evil or injury 
should be preferred (Al-Majallah, Art. 29). If two evils clash, the greater one should be 
prevented by committing the lesser one. See Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 87; Ibn Nujaym, 
supra note 49 at 89. 
109 Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 275.
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The criterion for choosing the most beneficial or least harmful should be 
taken from the point of reference of Sharīʿah law. In other words, one 
should consider Islamic texts when choosing what is more beneficial and 
what has lesser evil. Islam attaches more importance to what is prohibited 
(al-manhiyah) than what act is required (al-maʿmūrāt). The Prophet is 
reported to have said: “If I ask you to do something, do of it as much as 
you can, but if I forbid you something, you should refrain from it”.110 Thus 
is it possible to take a mortgage (conventional or purportedly Islamic) that 
ostensibly contains ribā under the pretext of ḍarar and the claim that the 
injury to be incurred when abstaining from ribā in a mortgage scenario is 
greater than giving it? In general, the rule can be violated in the presence 
of ḍarar. However, one cannot claim the gravity of ḍarar or the danger 
envisaged by not acting to prevent ḍarar.
With regard to interest-based mortgage and the protection of the five 
necessities, both benefits and evils are interwoven in the fabric of this issue. 
If ribā is to be taken as a case study, then it is beneficial for home seekers 
by engaging in it while, at the same time, it is evil and harm to the public 
as a whole by indulging in it. However, determining which harm/evil is 
greater may prove impossible, thus leaving the individual to decide the 
issue on the grounds of what is best according to his/her own faith.
2.5. Maxim of Authoritativeness of Custom and Culture
The fifth and last legal maxim agreed upon among Muslim classical jurist is 
al-ʿādah muḥakkamah (“custom is authoritative”).111 Al-ʿādah is defined as 
“practices that have been penetrated deep among people by recurrence and 
acceptable to people of sound nature,112 or a repeated matter which has 
no connection with reason”.113 ʿUrf is said to be synonymous with ʿādah 
because they resemble each other in definition and concept. It is technically 
defined as “what is established in life from reason and acceptable by sound 
natural disposition”.114 Giving custom legal ruling is inevitable in Islam 
110 Al-Bukhārī, supra note 52, Ḥadīth No. 6858; Muslim, supra note 52, Ḥadīth 
No. 1337.
111 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 89; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 92; Al-Majallah, Art. 
36; Haydar, supra note 94 at 40; Al-Zarkashi, Vol. 2, supra note 59 at 356; Al-Zarqā, supra 
note 49 at 219; Al-Hamawi, supra note 51 at 37.
112 Al-Zarqā, supra note 48 at 838.
113 Abu Sannah, Al-ʿUrf wa l-ʿādah fī Raʾy al-Fuqha, (n.p.1992), 8; Ali M. al-Jurjani, 
Kitāb al-Taʿrifāt. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1988) 149.
114 Al-Jurjānī, ibid., 154.
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owing to the nature of its universality the legality of the use of custom in 
Islamic Law is based on many textual evidence that are barely derivative 
and merely implicit. In Qur’ān verse 7:199, in which Allāh enjoins three 
things among which is ʿ urf (literally translated as good). In many traditions 
(aḥadīth, pl. Ḥadīth) of the Prophet, there are instances of giving customs 
authority and arbitration. The adjudication of custom can be found in the 
case of Barrā’ Ibn ‘Azib who approached the Prophet to ask about a camel 
which had entered and destroyed a man’s garden. The Prophet said: “The 
safety of the property is to be borne by the owner of the property in the 
day and the safety of the animal is to be borne by the owner of the animal 
in the night”. In another version he said: “. . . And the owner of the animal 
must be responsible for what the animal destroys in the night”.115
From these two versions of traditional narrations, jurists adjudicate that 
if animals destroy property during the day their own is not liable, but if 
property is destroyed during the night, the owner will bear legal responsi-
bility because the existing custom at that time was that owners of animals 
left their animals to forage for food during the day. However, acting con-
trary to that norm will mount to imposition of compensation on the per-
petrator.116 Remarking on the effect of this Ḥadīth, Ibn Najjar says: “this is 
the cogent and best ever proof of considering ʿādah in Islamic rules”.117
Having said that, there are many ways in which custom can be consid-
ered as an effective cause in Islamic issues. With regard to the issue of 
mortgage, it can be said that the conventional expression of interest in the 
banking system has gained customary usage even if it is not actually con-
sider to be ribā referred to in Islam. Thus, to forbid uttering such a phrase 
in today’s financial world could cause business to come to a halt and render 
Muslims backward in economic growth, whereas the set rule is istiʿmal 
115 Al-Nasai’, Sunān, Ḥadīth No. 5785; Abū Dāwūd, Sunān Abū Dāwūd, Vol. 8, Ḥadīth 
No. 3570, 17461, Muhammad Abdu l-Qadir Atā (Ed.), (Mecca: Dār al-Baz, 1994/1414) 
342; Dār al-Qutni, Sunān Dār al-Qutni, Vol. 3, Ḥadīth No. 217, in: Sayyid Abdullah 
Hashim al-Madani (Ed.), (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1966/1386), 155; Ahmad, Musnād, 
Vol. 4, Ḥadīth No. 18629, (Cairo: Muassasah Qurtub, n.d.), 295.
116 Ibn Abdu al-Barr, Al-Tamhīd, Vol. 11, in: Mustafa Ahmad al-Alawi (Ed.), (Morocco: 
Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs, 1387), 89; Muhammad Abadi, Awnu 
al-Maʿbud, Vol. 9, 2nd edn. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1995), 350; Muhammad 
Ibn Ismail al-San’ani, Subl al-Salaam, Vol. 3, in: Muhammad al-Khawli (Ed.), 4th edn. 
(Beirut: Dār ‘Ihya al-Turath al-Arabī, 1379), 264.
117 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Futuhi Ibn Najjar, Al-Kawkab al-Munir, Vol. 4, in: 
Muhammad al-Zuhayli and Nazih Hummad (Eds.), (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ubaykan, 
1997/1418), 40.
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al-nās hujjah yajib al-ʿamal bihi (“People’s practice is authoritative and 
should be reckoned with”).118 This submission can be easily refuted by 
considering another text in which uttering ambiguous expressions is pro-
hibited. Allāh says: “O believers! Address not the Prophet by the word 
rāʿin, but address him respectfully and listen to him” (Qur’ān 2:104). The 
reason for this prohibition was that the word rāʿin, being a homonym, was 
used abusively by some groups of non-Muslims in Madinah, although the 
Muslims used it with good intention.119 Thus, from the theory of sadd 
al-dhariʿa (“blocking means to evil”), it can be suggested that the use of the 
term ‘interest’ must be avoided.
Islamic jurists differ on the use of expressions similar to the phrase 
ribā in business transactions such as dah yazidah or dah dū zādah (Per-
sian phrase commonly used during the era when Islamic jurisprudence 
was documented): dah (10), yazidah (11) and dū zādah (12). Mālikī and 
Al-Shāfi‘ī jurists unconditionally permit such utterances while Ḥanafīs 
permit them in a fungible way if the buyer knows the details of that com-
modity. However, Ḥanbalīs consider the utterance detestable.120
Generally, customs and practices must be taken into consideration in 
any matter that is not detailed or when its verdict is based on ʿ urf and ‘ādah 
of the people who use it. In regulating the extent in which ʿurf is applied 
in Islamic law, Islamic jurists have unanimously agreed that if custom con-
tradicts explicit Qur’ānic and Ḥadīth texts (nasṣ)̣, the customary rule 
should be discarded. In other words, custom is of no use when there is 
factual text.121
However, the relevance of the above maxim is to broaden the authority 
for enforcing custom under Islamic law. If a custom does not contradict 
texts, then it is enforceable. Besides, the maxim also includes various types 
of ʿurf, be it general, individual, practical or verbal custom. It is unani-
mously agreed upon among Islamic jurists that if a custom is general, it is 
not restricted to a particular group of people, place or time such as customs 
practiced since the era of the Prophet to date, and it can specify the mean-
ing of texts, and analogy is not applicable to it. One example is the manu-
facturing contract or istisṇāʿ. Although this type of contract contradicts the 
118 Ibn Rajab, supra note 60 at 121-122; Al-Majallah, Art. 37; Al-Burnu, supra note 49 
at 292.
119 Kamali, supra note 82 at 400.
120 Muhammad Abdul Azeez al-Hudhayri, Kitāb Bayʿ al-ʿAyyinah maʿ Dirasah Mudāyanāt 
al-Aswāq, 113. 
121 Al-Zarqā, supra note 49 at 2.
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general principle of Islamic contracts, it is still allowed because it is a cus-
tom of people known since the first epoch of Islam.122 It is also noted that 
the Prophet permits selling fresh dates in exchange for dry ones (known as 
ʿarayah) because it has become custom and the masses were in need of it 
although it has been forbidden for fear of usury and gharar.123 The question 
that may be derived from this is whether conventional mortgages should 
be allowed on the basis that they have become general practice in Britain, 
including Muslims. Will changing this create an impasse for Muslims who 
are engaging in business transactions? Here, the spirit of Sharīʿah law must 
prevail. Throughout the history of Islamic law some prevailing practices 
have been allowed because they only slightly contradicted the overall objec-
tives of Islamic law, such as the case of ʿarayah, although by analogy they 
should have been forbidden; thus mortgages in this contemporary age may 
be provisionally allowed until alternative measures become available.
Moreover, ʿurf qawlī is a conventional term used by a certain group of 
people, the specific meaning of which is intuitively understood among the 
people who use it without any linguistic indication. In other words, verbal 
custom is a custom which is used in lieu of the original language where the 
original word and true meaning have become obsolete and derelict.124 One 
argument for rejecting the expression ‘interest’ in both conventional and 
Islamic transactions is because it is prohibited in Islam. However, if the 
word has become the conventional norm in a society, which does not nec-
essarily mean the prohibited one, should it also be disapproved? The maxim 
al-maʿrūf ʿurfan ka l-mashrūt shartan (“What is known by the virtue of 
custom is as a stipulated condition”)125 could be used to state that, since 
the phrase is well known among the two parties, it does not contain a pro-
hibited transaction, especially in Islamic mortgage contracts, and the sta-
tus quo of trading should be upheld. That means that the permissibility of 
such a contract is the rule.
However, the claim that the real meaning of ‘interest’ in Western cus-
tom is profit margin added to business deals can have its way in a subsid-
iary maxim on custom which states that al-ḥaqiqah tutrak bi dalālah 
al-ʿādah (“Real meaning shall be left out for denotation of custom”).126 This 
122 Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 277.
123 Kamali, supra note 67 at 82.
124 Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 281.
125 Al-Suyūtị̄, supra note 49 at 92; Ibn Nujaym, supra note 49 at 99; Al-Majallah, 
Art. 43; Al-Burnu, supra note 49 at 306.
126 Al-Majallah, Art. 40.
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means that if the real meaning of interest is culturally considered to be a 
non-prohibited transaction, it could still be accommodated under Islamic 
law within the scope of muʿāmalah. However, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi sheds 
light on the systematic transformation of the original word ‘usury’, which 
means prohibited ribā in Islamic law, to the new word ‘interest’. In his 
historical account on the development of ‘interest’ in the West, Qureshi 
explains that, during the reign of Henry VIII, prohibition of usury began 
to be renewed in 1545 after it had been strongly condemned and prohib-
ited in the early stage of the Roman Empire.127 The renewal of usury in 
that age was a result of the weakness of the Church and subsequently was 
what the reformist considered a reasonable charge of interest “on the plea 
of human weakness”.128 Thus, the word ‘usury’ began progressively to be 
replaced by ‘interest’. If that is the case, it will be abhorrent and arguable 
to submit that the word ‘interest’ as used today in conventional banking 
shares no roots with ribā prohibited in Islam. This shows that there is no 
difference between the two words historically but rather an evolutional 
derogation and acrobatic dissimilation of usage. Thus, the rule in Islamic 
law is that when a word has hidden meaning(s), moral counsel says to 
avoid it.
3. Conclusion
This article has sought for balance between rigidity in the application of 
Islamic rulings and the exercise of religious concessions. It is undeniable 
that Muslims living in the West face spiritual, social and economical chal-
lenges in their day-to-day activities. This calls for an enquiry into Sharīʿah 
objectives (maqāsịd al-sharīʿah) in prohibiting certain aspects of business 
transactions. Among the Sharīʿah’s objective mechanisms are intentionality 
behind the ruling as well as the individual’s intended action with regard 
to a particular issue. While intention may be solely considered in ritual 
activities, the same is not true for social activities in general and commer-
cial endeavours in particular. Thus there are many reasons, among others, 
that the rights of a human being is linked to any litigation generated as 
a result of dispute among the parties involved in the contract. However, 
in mortgage issues, the effect seems to be given to intention and meaning 
127 Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, Islam and the Theory of Interest, (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1961), 7.
128 Qureshi, ibid., p. 9.
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rather than expression (verbal action). This forms the basis for allowing 
Muslim home seekers to have interpreted the expression stated in a mort-
gage contract differently. However, custom has the authority to determine 
the meaning of an expression if there is no explicit contradiction with 
Islamic texts.
However, the ambiguity in the purported Islamic finance mortgage has 
cast doubt on the certainty of ḥalālity of the products offered to Muslim 
home seekers. This creates a gap for critics of Islamic home finance to 
undermine efforts in the Islamization of Islamic finances in general and 
mortgages in particular. When considering Islamic concessions (rukhsạh) 
in the face of hardship or necessity, however, ambiguity has far less an 
impact on the approval of such products provisionally in as much as the 
aim is to protect the five necessities of life set by Islamic scholars: i.e., reli-
gion, life, property, offspring and talent. To answer to what extent this 
provision can be exploited, one can turn to issue of proportionality and 
relativity. One has the right to recourse to rukhsạh but without transgres-
sion. However, that which constitutes transgression is absolutely relative.
As Muslims enjoy their religious concession rights, they also have the 
obligation to strive for better conditions that will comply with their faith. 
Although it may prove more difficult with the power of international mon-
etary organizations, there is still room for individual as well as collective 
efforts. Co-operatives could be one of the ways to solve the mortgage prob-
lem by which individuals and organizations who are mindful of their obli-
gation before Islam invest in this business.
Islamic banks have to shoulder the responsibility of ascertaining the 
ḥalālity of their products to protect Muslim clients from unwarranted 
ostensible violation of Islamic rulings. This will ensure that their faith has 
not been compromised and the trust they vested in Islamic branded prod-
ucts has not been jeopardized. The British Government can also be pressed 
to acknowledge the fact that not only Muslims will benefit from interest-
free home finance but also the general public that has been lured by con-
ventional banks to avoidable economic recession and human depression.

